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NATIVE NATIONALISM IN SPANISH MOROCCO

Description

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An analysis of the origins, character, and influence, of the native nationalist movements in Spanish Morocco.

1 June 1944

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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Summary

Because of its location, Spanish Morocco is in a position to dominate the western entrance of the Mediterranean, and at the same time it forms a link between the European and African continents. For these reasons the political sentiments and activities of the native inhabitants are significant.

The native people, most of whom are Arabized Berbers, have always been animated by an indomitable fighting spirit and by an unquenchable desire for independence. The Riffians, who inhabit the eastern area, for centuries owed to the Sultan of Fez nothing more than a nominal allegiance, and when the Spaniards invaded their country, they resisted fiercely. Soon the Riffians' hatred for the Spanish conquerors identified itself with a nationalist movement which aimed at the creation of a Riffian independent state. The climax of native opposition to foreign encroachment came with the war that broke out in 1921 between the Riff and Spain. For five years disaster threatened Spain; only at the cost of great sacrifices and with French aid was Spain finally able to beat the Riff into submission.

After the defeat, new native nationalist movements, influenced by Pan-Islamism and by French Moroccan movements favoring unification of the two Protectorate Zones, rose to combat Spanish and French colonial domination. Islamic cultural propaganda and political pressure were the principal weapons employed. The Spanish civil war gave the Nationalists a unique opportunity to wring concessions from the new Spanish Government and to expand their activities.

The outbreak of World War II found the Nationalists of Spanish Morocco still striving for their objective: emancipation from foreign rule. While, however, the basic objective remained the same, the policy of the Nationalists was affected by a number of factors. Among these were: (1) the attempt of the Spaniards to deflect native hostility from themselves by trying to intensify anti-French sentiment; (2) their effort to weaken the nationalist movement by covertly fomenting dissension among the parties; and (3) the intense activities of German subversive propagandists. The Allied landings in North Africa brought a more favorable attitude toward the United Nations and stabilized to a certain extent Nationalist policy. An important recent development has been the support given by Spanish Zone Nationalists to the program of the nationalist movement of French Morocco, and their united determination to achieve the independence of Morocco under the rule of the Sultan. Both groups have referred to the Atlantic Charter in stating their claims and have apparently pinned their hopes on the promise of freedom which they believe this document offers.

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The current situation causes Spain no little apprehension. Aside from the Islamic nationalist parties, whose influence is confined to the educated elements of urban centers, there are the Berber tribes of the rural areas who have long clung to the idea of an independent Riff, and whose rancor against Spain has never lessened. Nevertheless, Riffian (separatist) and Moroccan (unitary) nationalists are working hand in hand against a common enemy. Spain cannot ignore, therefore, the potential threat that native nationalism represents to her, and the recent strengthening of military control and the adoption of other precautionary measures in the Protectorate betray her uneasiness. For only military force can keep in check the Riffians, animated as they are by a thirst for independence and by a vengeful spirit. Nor is Spain unaware of the Riffians' warlike characteristics, which she has learned by experience not to underestimate.

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I

INTRODUCTIONGeography
and
Population

Spanish Morocco is a mountainous country with two main ranges forming the northern coastal massif, one west of and including Ceuta, called the Jebala, the other between Ceuta and Melilla, known as the Riff. The majority of the inhabitants are Moslems of Berber stock, but Arab culture and customs have deeper roots among the people of the Jebala than among the Riffians.¹ Before World War I, the Riff tribes enjoyed complete independence and their territory was considered a no-man's land to outsiders. The Sultan of Fes had never succeeded in gaining full control over the warlike habilas (Berber tribes) of the Riff, consequently their authority over this region was limited to a nominal suzerainty.²

Early
Spanish
Encroach-
ment

The first Spanish foothold on the coast of Morocco was acquired in 1597, when the Lord Lieutenant of Andalusia seized Melilla. Subsequently, a number of ports fell into Spanish hands, and these were immediately organized as "presidios" or penal settlements. Spain watched with envy French expansion in North Africa during the first half of the nineteenth century, and thereupon decided to embark on a colonial adventure in Morocco. In 1847, Spanish possessions in Africa were unified under a Captain-Generalship, while the presidios, hitherto neglected, were viewed as starting-points for a conquest of the hinterland.³ Incessant Riffian attacks on the presidios gave Spain the pretext to declare war on Morocco in 1859. The Makhzen (central Moroccan Government) at once offered certain concessions and security guarantees to the Spanish Government, which were refused.⁴ The Spaniards, after scoring some local military successes of small consequence, accepted British mediation proposals and, in 1860, signed a peace treaty with the Sultan.⁵ Tribal disturbances near Melilla nearly precipitated

1. According to the best estimates, the population of Spanish Morocco and the Zone of Tangier is as follows: Europeans, approximately 70,000 native Moslems, approximately 800,000 of which 50 percent are Riffians.
2. Great Britain Foreign Office, Spanish Morocco, (London, 1920); Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, (London, 1926); W.B. Harris, France, Spain, and the Rif, (London 1927).
3. Great Britain Foreign Office, op. cit., pp. 3-11.
4. Ibid.
5. Information Bulletin #14, July 1922.

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another war in 1893, which the Sultan averted through an indemnity paid to Spain for outrages committed.¹ In 1909, the discovery of minerals attracted Spanish capital and enterprise into the territory of the Riff. The natives, regarding this as an ill-intentioned intrusion, came to a bloody conflict with the Spaniards, who had great difficulties in checking the onslaught.²

The Franco-Spanish agreement of 1912, which granted Spain a protectorate over northern Morocco, spurred the Spanish program of military expansion in North Africa that had started in 1911 with the occupation of Alcazar and Larache.³ Spain aimed at bringing the Jebala tribes under her sway before undertaking a campaign against the warlike natives of the Riff. Nevertheless, the subjugation of the Jebala, which proved extremely difficult, required several years owing to native resistance and Spanish inexperience in dealing with colonial problems. Spanish officials employed a variety of methods to impose their authority over the natives. They fomented tribal disputes in accordance with the policy of divide and conquer, subsidized local chiefs and notables, and when these methods proved unsuccessful, they resorted to military force. The Caid Mulay Hamid-er Raisuli of the kabila of Beni Aros, a wily tribal chief and a notorious marauder, was erroneously believed capable of controlling the tribes of the Jebala area, and Spain spent a fortune to subsidize him. Raisuli, however, betrayed the Spaniards whenever he had the opportunity, and often fought against them.⁴ In 1921, despite the occupation of Tetuan in 1913 and of Xauen in 1920, Spain's control over the Jebala was still very unstable. Cajolery and acts of brutality⁵ had the effect of increasing native resentment against the occupants and paved the way for the general revolt that soon broke out.

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1. Great Britain Foreign Office, op. cit., pp. 6-11.
 2. American Legation in San Sebastian to State Department, 30 July 1909.
 3. Information Bulletin #14, op. cit.
 4. L'Afrique Francaise, May 1925.
 5. W.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 97-99.

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II

NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Riffian
Nationalism
and
Reaction
Against
Spain

Spanish colonial policy had even more disastrous consequences in the Riff; it turned the early suspicions and misgivings of the tribes into a current of anti-Spanish sentiment, which made the natives politically conscious and soon identified itself with a Riffian nationalist movement that united the turbulent kabilas in the determination to preserve, in defiance of Spanish protectorate claims, their centuries-old independence. The integration of these native aspirations into a political movement with a definite purpose and program was achieved through the efforts and intelligent leadership of the Abd-el-Krim family, which, at the beginning of the century, ruled over the Beni Uriaghel, the largest and most powerful kabila of the Riff.

Alarmed by Spanish designs in Morocco, aware of the inadequacy of Riffian methods of warfare as compared with Western mechanical techniques, the Caid Abd-el-Krim el-Khattabi conceived a plan for westernizing the Riff, so that it could withstand Spanish pressure with a better chance of success.¹ The Caid's relationship, during the second decade of the century, with European mining prospectors and industrialists (the German brothers Mannesmann, Echevarrieta de Bilbao) who came to the Riff attracted by the mineral resources of the Beni Uriaghel district, gave considerable impetus to his plans of westernization.² He sent his two sons Mohammed and M'hammed to Spanish schools, where they became conversant with the art of modern warfare and the science of technology, and where they also acquired an excellent knowledge of world affairs. On their return to the homeland, Mohammed and his brother helped the father in his political work and at the same time actively fostered among the natives the revolutionary doctrine of Riffian nationalism.³

The program of this political movement, according to Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim's declarations,⁴ provided for (1) an independent national state that included the territories of the Riff

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-112; Roger-Mathieu, *Memoires d'Abd-el-Krim*, (Paris 1927).
2. *L'Afrique Francaise*, October 1921.
3. *Ibid.*, October 1921, October 1923.
4. *Manchester Guardian*, 12 February 1926; *The Times*, 17 March 1926.

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and of the Jebala, since the Nationalists contended that this part of Morocco had cultural characteristics of its own and quite different from the rest of the Shereefian Empire; (2) a republican form of government, with the provision that full powers were to be granted to the Abd-el-Krim family during the first period of transitional stage, until the citizens of the new state were sufficiently educated to take the government in their own hands; (3) a program of education for the people, in which the basic teachings of the Koran would be combined with the best achievements of the West in science and industry; (4) the economic development of the country; and finally, (5) friendly relations with all neighboring and foreign nations. In this program, the implicit repudiation of the Makhzen's authority did not fail to draw the protests of the Sultan against Riffian "dissidence."¹

There was little basis for an understanding or even for a compromise between the Riffians, irrevocably committed as they were to a program of total independence and self-government, and Spain, which regarded the natives of Morocco as an inferior people whose territory offered strategic and economic advantages. In addition, Morocco was a convenient outlet for many Spaniards dissatisfied with conditions in the mother country. Moreover, Spain could not give up, as the Nationalists demanded, the protectorate rights she had acquired in a treaty with France, without suffering a loss of international prestige. A crisis broke out in 1919, when the Spanish military leaders frustrated Abd-el-Krim's negotiations with a Spanish syndicate for the exploitation of mineral resources, while they continued to push on the military occupation.² On the Caid's death in 1920, his elder son Mohammed assumed the leadership of native resistance, which his father had begun to organize.³ In 1941, - 1921? Spanish advance into the Beni Uriaghel district led to a clash, which marked the beginning of a bloody struggle between the Riff and Spain.⁴

The campaign, which lasted five years, was characterized at first by a series of spectacular Riffian successes.⁵ The colonial army was almost annihilated, and in less than a year the whole of the Riff, except Melilla, and most of the Jebala were evacuated.⁶

1. W.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 232-233.
2. OSS source.
3. Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 115.
5. Le Temps, 14 December 1924; The Times, 28 June 1924.
6. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 115-118.

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Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim turned out to be a skillful military leader who knew how to exploit the weak points of the enemy. His troops were taught to use the modern weapons and equipment the Spaniards abandoned wholesale in the rout. This was apparently the only source of supply from which the Riffians obtained war materiel.¹ With the progress of the war thus favoring Abd-el-Krim's cause, the Jebala tribes, whose resentment against Spanish colonialism had grown stronger year by year, joined the Riffian Nationalists.² Emboldened by these achievements, Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Riff. A government was set up in Ajdir, the capital of the new state, and various delegations were sent to London and Paris to ask for its recognition. This was denied, however, on account of previous Franco-British declarations that had recognized Spain's protectorate rights in northern Morocco. Having failed to obtain belligerent rights from the Western Powers, Abd-el-Krim remained, from a viewpoint of international law, a "rebel" against the lawful authority of Spain.³

In 1924, a frontier incident between French Morocco and the Riff involved the French, despite the reluctance of the political and military leaders of Rabat, in the conflict.⁴ The intervention in 1925 of France on the side of Spain reversed the course of the war, and in 1926, all the hopes of the Riffian Nationalists were shattered. Abd-el-Krim, finding further resistance impossible, surrendered to the French, who exiled him to Reunion Island.⁵

Pan-
Islamic
Influence

The Riffian campaign proved a bitter and costly experience to Spain, both in men and money. After the defeat of Abd-el-Krim, it was urged in Madrid that a revision of colonial policy was urgently needed if further bloodshed and humiliation were to be avoided. The whole of northern Morocco was now, in 1926, under Spanish control. The practice of regarding the Zone of Protectorate as a virtual possession, or the policy of "reconquista", as the Spaniards called it, was abandoned, and the authorities displayed more good-will than

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1. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
 2. Information Bulletin #14, July 1923.
 3. The Times, 5 August 1922.
 4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 134; W.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 194-207; for details concerning events in the French Zone see R & A No. 1963, Native Nationalism in French North Africa.
 5. ISIS, Morocco, "Historical Sketch," p. 6.

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previously in their attitude toward the natives. The army was not permitted to mistreat the population. The customs of the country were respected. The influence of the clergy--who had supported the Moroccan campaign in the hope of fulfilling Queen Isabel's testament (the pursuit and subjugation of the Moslem infidels in Africa)¹ was eliminated from colonial affairs.² Spain was attempting to conciliate the tribes with the Protectorate regime and make them forget past grievances.

Nevertheless, defeat did not entirely obliterate the nationalist sentiment that the Abd-el-Krim family had instilled among the masses of the Riff and Jebala. The failure of armed resistance had been, indeed, a hard blow to native independence aspirations. Dependency and a temporary disorientation succeeded the grim resolution that had animated the resistance. Yet, in the midst of the general dejection, the intellectuals looked for moral support and guidance outside the Moroccan frontiers, in order to revive the struggle for independence at an opportune moment. This support and guidance they found in the centers of Pan-Islamism, Egypt and the Near East.

Originally, the Pan-Islamic movement had possessed a religious character, and had tried to unite politically all Moslems under Islam's banner. Since the downfall of the Sublime Porte, however, the movement as such lost its appeal. There was no longer a Khalifat-el-Islam (Caliph of Islam) and the Pan-Islamic slogan "there is no nationality in Islam" aroused no great enthusiasm anywhere. After the first World War, the movement survived in the Eastern part of the Arab World among old-fashioned and conservative Moslem circles, with which North Africans have been traditionally most closely identified. Al-Gzhar University in Cairo, and various religious colleges in Damascus and Nablus, which have always attracted a large number of students from North Africa, continued to be the focal points of the Pan-Islamic anti-Christian movement.

Abd-el-Khalik Torres, native of Tetuan and son of a Pasha, spent many years in Eastern schools of Pan-Islamic tendency. On his return to Spanish Morocco in 1930, he organized a campaign of nationalist propaganda, which was confined, however, to intellectual circles in Tetuan. In a few years he obtained a large following among the cultured elements of the Zone, and in 1936 this group became known as the party of National Reform.³

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1. Roger-Mathieu, op. cit., p. 85; Rodrigo Soriano, guerra, guerra, al infiel Marroqui, 1922.
 2. W.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
 3. CID #35178-S.

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The Party's aim was to obtain from the Spanish Government, chiefly by propaganda and similar methods of political pressure, an extensive reform of the Protectorate regime. Torres claimed that Spain's rule in Morocco was not a true protectorate. To him, a protectorate was only a mandate, and therefore, a foreign administration of limited duration. During that temporary stage it was the obligation of the "protecting" power, Torres maintained, to prepare the natives, by means of a sound educative program and intensive training in administration, for self-government and independence within the shortest possible time.¹

Spanish
Civil War
developments

The political program of Torres had only a nuisance value, until an opportunity was found to press forward its demands upon the outbreak of the Spanish civil war. At that time, Franco opened a recruiting campaign among the natives of the Protectorate to meet urgent manpower needs of the Insurgent army. Fearing that the National Reform Party might constitute a serious obstacle in the recruiting for a war entirely alien to Moroccan interests, Franco entered into negotiations with Torres. As a result, the Nationalists won from the Spanish Insurgents a promise of reforms to be introduced into the Zone at the end of the conflict and to be followed shortly by total independence.²

The National Reform Party grew stronger with this unexpected Spanish support, and its propaganda among the natives increased in range and volume. At the same time, the Franco-Torres agreement brought this Nationalist group so close to the new Spanish regime that it could not escape the pressure of its political ideology. Torres and his followers began to revolve in the Axis orbit. Franco's promises, while they stimulated nationalist activities, opened the gates of Spanish Morocco wide to German propaganda and intrigue, which became a critical menace to Allied interests in this area when the second World War broke out.

Pan-Moroccan
Currents

The splitting of the Shereefian Empire into two "spheres of influence" had always been deprecated in native political circles of the French Zone as an encouragement to native disunity, which was to the exclusive advantage of the colons and the colonial powers. For the same reason the powerful Nationalist groups of Fez condemned all native schismatic movements. This Pan-Moroccan sentiment gained ground in the Spanish Zone during 1936-38, when some Fez Nationalists sought refuge there to escape French persecution. Among these refugees were two outstanding leaders, Mekki en-Nasiri of the Nationalist Bloc and Brahim el-Wazzani of the Popular Movement, who immediately set in motion a propaganda campaign among the natives of northern Morocco

1. See the Reformist program in F.H. Mellor, Morocco Awakes, (London, 1939).
2. CID #35178-S; L'Afrique Francaise, October 1936.

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directed not only against Spanish domination, but also and particularly against the greater power of France.

The agreement Torres reached with Franco was, among other things, an implicit acknowledgment of the Spanish Protectorate, to which Reformist action was confined. A conflict of policy soon developed between the Reformist group and the Pan-Moroccan Nationalists rallied around Nasiri. The latter held a meeting at Tetuan on 11 December 1937, in which they disavowed Reformist policies and declared themselves a new party called Moroccan Unity (*Unidad Marroqui*), whose adopted program contained the following main points: (1) freedom of native cultural activities; (2) an education exclusively Moslem for the Moroccan people; (3) end of economic discrimination in favor of the European colon to the detriment of the native; and (4) increased native participation in the Administration, with a view to terminating foreign supremacy at the earliest opportunity. The program was a facsimile of the Plan of Moroccan Reform embodied in the Resolution of the Rabat Nationalist Congress of 15 October 1937.¹ In addition, the Moroccan Unity party proclaimed its solidarity with French Zone Nationalists.

Brahim el-Wazzani, who came to the Spanish Zone in 1938, belonged to a nationalist group which, although of Pan-Moroccan sentiment, was less religious and less conservative in outlook than Moroccan Unity and its French counterpart, the Nationalist Bloc. He formed an organization known as the Bureau of National Defense, which closely cooperated with Moroccan Unity, although Wazzani often had a tendency toward radicalism and violence.²

Spanish Policy Toward Native Nationalism

After the fall of the Republican regime in Spain, the attitude of the new government toward native nationalism in the Protectorate was increasingly subordinated to foreign policy considerations. In 1940, the collapse of the French armies in Flanders stimulated Spanish expansionistic ambitions in North Africa, while it enhanced Axis prestige and influence in the Iberian peninsula as well as in Morocco.³ These political trends induced Spain to support and encourage the anti-French propaganda carried on by Pan-Moroccan groups. The fostering of native hatred for France, which had its foundation in the Berber tribes' grudge against the French for their intervention in the Riffian war, not only helped Madrid's expansionistic designs, but also served to distract native resentment for Spanish rule in Morocco. In order to appease the Nationalists for her own political purpose, Spain granted them a relative freedom of press, permitted them to expand Moslem culture activities in the Zone, subsidized annual pilgrimages to Mecca, organized various expeditions of students to Egypt, and even allowed the merchant marine of the Protectorate to fly

1. CID #28474-R.

2. *Ibid.*; CID #28925-S.

3. *The Times*, 17 June 1940; *Ibid.*, 22 June 1940; *Ibid.*, 21 September 1940.

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the Moroccan flag.¹ To forestall demands for the fulfillment of early promises of independence, however, the Protectorate authorities endeavored to undermine the Nationalist movement by exploiting and fomenting dissensions within and between the various parties.² This policy of overt appeasement and covert obstruction accounted, in part, for the devious course of Spanish Zone Nationalist activities prior to the Allied landing in North Africa.

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1. Tomas Garcia Figueras, Marruecos, (Barcelona, 1939) p. 291.
 2. CID #35178-S; L'Afrique Francaise, "L'Afrique et L'Espagne", January-December 1939.

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III

NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II

Native
Nationalism
in the War
and The
Atlantic
Charter

The ideological differences that for a long time had kept apart the two major Nationalist groups in the Spanish Zone, the Nationalist Reform Party headed by Torres (Pan-Islamic) and Moroccan Unity headed by Nasiri (Pan-Moroccan), began to lose importance with the progress of World War II. For, although at variance on questions of principle and method, the two Parties had a common basic objective, to rid their country of foreign (Western) rule. Moreover, the repercussions in North Africa of the international tension created by the war pointed up the need for Nationalist concerted action. Spanish diplomacy, however, attempted to prevent the unification of these nationalist movements, and it was not until 1943 that the two Parties were able to form a united front.

Until that time, German propaganda, which was extremely active in Morocco prior to the collapse of the Axis armies in North Africa, exerted strong pressure on the natives of the Spanish Zone. The reaction of the Nationalists to this propaganda varied according to the group and its political background, although these groups were all deeply impressed by the initial military successes of the Axis in Europe and were prone to sympathize with Germany, from whom they hoped to obtain eventual support for their cause. The Reformists, owing to their early relations with the Franquist movement, were particularly receptive to Nazi suggestions and more inclined than Moroccan Unity to side with the Axis. The latter group, while actually not opposed to the enlistment of foreign support for its own purposes, manifested unwillingness to collaborate actively with the Axis lest it become a tool of foreign interests, and for this reason often used its influence to moderate pro-Axis currents in the Reformist faction.¹

After the German defeat in North Africa, however, and the strengthening of the Allied position in that area, the Axis lost its prestige among Spanish Zone Nationalists, whose political sympathies veered toward the Anglo-Americans. Meanwhile, the three most influential Nationalists leaders of Spanish Morocco, Torres, Nasiri,

1. CID #30116; O.S. Tangier, 13 February 1943.

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and Wazzani, held a meeting at Tetuan early in 1943. The result of this meeting was the fusion of the Nationalist Reform Party and Moroccan Unity into a single bloc, with Nasiri seemingly taking the lead in political affairs.¹ The newly-formed movement, which acquired a definite Pan-Moroccan character, aligned itself politically with the Nationalists of the French Zone,² with whom it is known to have collaborated ever since.

The German defeat and consequent loss of prestige was not the only factor responsible for this change of attitude. The Atlantic Charter and its promise of freedom for all nations had deep repercussions in both Protectorate Zones.³ Moreover, the release from jail of several Nationalists in the French Zone after the Allied landing greatly enhanced the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the Nationalists of northern Morocco.⁴

The petition presented by Istiqlal (French Moroccan Nationalist Party) to French and Allied authorities in January 1944, asking for unification of the two Zones, Moroccan independence under the Sultan's government, democratic institutions, adherence to the Atlantic Charter, and a voice in the Peace Conference, found prompt and favorable response among Spanish Moroccan Nationalists.⁵ Thus, the adherence of the latter to the French Zone Nationalist program created a unity of purpose which gave new significance to the strength of Moroccan nationalism, no longer local in action and character, but embracing the whole of the Sherrefian Empire. The concern that Spanish Protectorate authorities have shown over these recent developments reflects their apprehension of possible future complications. Measures of ban and censorship applied to the Nationalist press, and the adoption of military precautions,⁶ are positive indications of mounting tension between Spaniards and native Nationalists, although thus far no outbreaks or disturbances have been reported from Spanish Morocco.

Riffian and
Moroccan
Nationalism

Pan-Moroccan nationalism has scarcely affected the Berber tribes of northern Morocco. The propaganda and cultural activities of the movement, which is guided by arabized intellectuals interested in political freedom and the preservation of the Moroccan Sultanate's Islamic traditions, reaches only the educated nuclei that exist in the few cities of the Zone.⁷ The old dissident Riffian currents, which

1. CID #28925-S; OSS source S, 15 March 1943.
2. CID #28587-S.
3. CID #61586-S.
4. CID #20587-S.
5. OSS #29913, 7 March 1944.
6. Ibid.
7. CID #63563-C.

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had been stimulated during the second and third decade of this century by Abd-el-Krim's militant nationalism, are reportedly still preponderant among the kabilas that inhabit the rural areas and the hill country, particularly in the Riff where Islamic culture has not penetrated deeply. Riffian Nationalist activities have been made difficult, however, by Spanish vigilance and the enforcement of a strict military control,¹ although a minor party, known as the Liberal Party, was formed in the Beni Uriaghel district a few years ago and is still active.² Many Riffians are known to have joined the Pan-Moroccan Nationalists in the struggle against foreign domination, while actually not sharing the political convictions of Moroccan Unity and the Reformists. Riffian resentment against Spain--and to a lesser extent against France--for the defeat suffered in 1926 has persisted ever since Abd-el-Krim went into exile. The kabilas have retained their traditional warlike characteristics, and are animated by a spirit of revenge that only military force can keep in check.

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1. CID #62758-C.
 2. CID #63563-C.

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Appendix I

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1597	Spanish seizure of Melilla
1847	Unification of Spanish possessions in Africa under a Captain-Generalship
1859-60	War between Spain and Morocco
1893	Disturbances in Melilla area
1909	Discovery of minerals near Melilla Clashes between Spaniards and natives
1911	Occupation of Alcazar and Larache
1912	Franco-Spanish Protectorate Convention and division of the Shereefian Empire into two "spheres of influence"
1913	Occupation of Tetuan
1919	Crisis in Spanish-Riffian relations
1920	Occupation of Xauen Death of Abd-el-Krim
1 June 1921	Clash at Mt. Aburan. Beginning of Spanish Riffian war
21 June 1921	Annihilation of Spanish post at Mt. Igueriben
22 July 1921	Spanish disaster of Annual
9 August 1921	Spanish capitulation at Mt. Arruit followed by proclamation of Riff Republic
12 Sept. 1921	Beginning of Spanish counter-offensive
1922	Spanish defeat at Tizzi-Assa. Riffian political mission visits London and Paris
1924	Spanish evacuation of Xauen. First Franco-Riffian incidents
13 April 1925	Riffian offensive against Fez launched Beginning of Franco-Riffian hostilities

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Appendix I (cont'd)

24 May 1926	Surrender of Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim End of Riffian war
1930	Torres returns to Tetuan from the Near East
1936	Party of National Reform founded Agreement between Franco and Torres at out- break of Spanish civil war
11 Dec. 1937	Founding of Moroccan Unity
1938	Arrival of Wazzani in the Spanish Zone
April 1939	End of Spanish Civil War
1 Sept. 1939	Beginning of World War II
13 June 1940	Collapse of French armies in Europe. Spanish declaration of non-belligerency
14 June 1940	Occupation of Tangier
8 Nov. 1942	Allied landing in North Africa
February 1943	Coalition of Moroccan Nationalist groups in the Spanish Zone
May 1943	Collapse of Axis armies in Africa
January 1944	Adherence of Spanish Zone Nationalists to <u>Istiqlal's</u> petition.

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Appendix II

OUTSTANDING NATIVE NATIONALISTS IN SPANISH MOROCCO

AHMED AZERKAN

Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim's Prime Minister during the Riffian campaign.
His conduct during the last phases of the campaign in 1926 won him the enmity of the Riffian tribes who forced him to seek refuge in the French Zone.
Lives now in exile between Mazagan and Settat (French Morocco).

MOHAMMED BUDRA

Riffian Nationalist and a relative of Abd-el-Krim.
Leader of the Liberal Party.

MOHAMMED CHENIAJ

Leader of the Moroccan Youth Party
His political sympathies are for the Franco Government.

GHALI EL-DAUD

Torres' principal lieutenant and leader of the Reformist Party branch in Alcazar.

MULAY EL-HASSAN BEN EL-MEHDI BEN-ISMAEL BEN-MOHAMMED

Khalifa of the Spanish Zone, or the Sultan's Viceroy.
He owes his position to the Spaniards and is, therefore, inclined to sympathize with them.

AHMED BEN-MOHAMMED BEN-SEDDIK EL-HASANI

Sheik of the Brotherhood of the Dorkawa.
At present in Tangier.

MOHAMMED BEN-ABD-EL-KRIM EL-KHATTABI

Son of Abd-El-Krim el-Khattabi, Caid of the kabila of Beni Uriaghel.
Leader of the Riffian resistance, now in exile at Reunion.

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Appendix II (cont'd)

M'HAMMED BEN-ABD-EL-KRIS EL-KHATTABI

Mohammed's younger brother. Was Commander-in-Chief of the Riffian army and its engineering expert. Headed the Riffian mission that visited London and Paris in 1922, demanding recognition of the Riff Republic. Presumably in exile with his brother at Reunion.

MUKKI EN-NASIRI

Refugee from the French Zone
A conservative Moslem intellectual and a former member of the Nationalist Bloc (French Moroccan Nationalist Party) Leader of Moroccan Unity and the most influential Nationalist in the Spanish Zone at the present time.

ABD-ES-SELLAM ET-TENSAMANI

A Riffian Nationalist collaborating with Nasiri. Has been described as enjoying great prestige among the Riffian tribes.

ABD-EL-KHALIQ TORRES

An intellectual of Tetuan and son of a Pasha. Studied in Pan-Islamic schools in Egypt and the Near East. Since 1936 the leader (and founder) of the National Reform Party. In the past was strongly under Franquist and Axis influence.

BRAHIM EL-WAZZANI

Formerly a member of the Popular Movement, a French Zone Nationalist party led by a cousin of his now in exile. Came to the Spanish Zone in 1938. Head and founder of the Bureau of National Defense. Collaborated with Nasiri, although of radical tendencies. Described as extremely opportunistic. Has powerful connections among the Nationalists of Fez.

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Appendix III

NATIVE PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN SPANISH MOROCCO

EL-WAHDA EL-MAGHRIBIYYA (MOROCCAN UNITY)

The strongest organized native nationalist movement in the Spanish Zone, and is headed by Mekki el-Nasiri. It has for its program unification of the two Zones and independence under the Sultan. Its headquarters are Tetuan, and it publishes a paper (El-Wahda el-Maghribiyya) in Spanish and Arabic. It has branches at Alcazar, Xauen, and Tangier.

HIZB EL-AHRAR (LIBERAL PARTY)

A party headed by Mohammed Budra and operating in the Beni Uriaghol district. Its aim is the creation of a Riffian separate state. The character, strength, and activities of this party are obscure.

HIZB EL-ISLAH EL-NATANI (PARTY OF NATIONAL REFORM)

This party was founded in 1936 by Torres who is its leader. It was influenced by Pan-Islamic currents, and had strong sympathies for Franco and the Axis. Since 1943, however, it joined Moroccan Unity and adhered to its program. Its headquarters are also at Tetuan, and has a branch at Alcazar. It publishes a paper known as El-Islah (Freedom).


MOROCCAN YOUTH PARTY

The party was created in 1943 to counteract the influence of Moroccan Unity and the Reformists. It is sponsored by the Spaniards. Its leader is Mohammed Cheniaj. The Party has seemingly little influence.

BROTHERHOOD OF THE DERKAWA

A religious-political sect, with affiliations throughout North Africa, including Tripolitania. It has a strong following in Spanish Morocco. Its attitude is xenophobic rather than nationalistic, and has no connection with the Nationalist parties. Its headquarters are in the Wargha Valley, south of the Riff, and is led by the Sheikh El-Hasani.

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